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During an oral argument in a recent dispute about the constitutionality of
critical provisions of the Voting Rights Act, Justice Antonin Scalia
controversially announced that he was concerned about the “perpetuation of racial
entitlements.”1 He explained, “[w]henever a society adopts racial entitlements, it
is very difficult to get out of them through the normal political processes.”2 Much
of the subsequent uproar was directed at Justice Scalia’s linking of the Voting
Rights Act with a racial entitlement. But what is perhaps more interesting from
the perspective constitutional law is the conception of the operation of politics
that animated his assertions.3 Presumably, if racial entitlements could be
overturned through the normal political process, it would not be appropriate for
the Court to intervene. But for Justice Scalia, in the normal political process that
exists, there is nothing “to be gained by any [congressperson] to vote against
continuation of this act.”4 As a result, “[the Act] will be reenacted in perpetuity
unless … a court can say it does not comport with the Constitution.”5
The normal political process that seems to exists in Justice Scalia’s mind
is one in which those who stand to gain from civil rights legislation are politically
influential while those who stand to lose are politically impotent. It is the racial
minorities who are politically powerful and the members of the white majority
who are politically weak. While a great deal of attention has been directed at
Justice Scalia’s statement in oral argument, it wasn’t the first time that
conservative members of the Court proffered such a conception of politics when
interpreting civil rights statutes and the Constitution. For example, three years
earlier in Ricci v. DeStefano, the three more conservative members of the Court,
Justices Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas, and Scalia, suggested that politicians
representing the city of New Haven withdrew a test that would have denied
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promotion opportunities for all but a few racial minority firefighters pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.6 The conservative justices surmised after an
analysis of the process of adoption of the state action that the reason for the
withdrawal of the test was the New Haven politicians’ “desire to please a
politically important racial constituency.”7 Thirteen years before that in Romer v.
Evans, Justices Scalia, William Rehnquist, and Clarence Thomas writing in
dissent, argued that a Colorado statewide initiative invalidating local ordinances
protecting individuals from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
should have been upheld. For the dissenters, the initiative represented “a modest
attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores
against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through
the use of the laws.”8
Many would argue that this conception of politics in which minorities are
politically powerful and members of the majority are politically weak has it
entirely backwards. These opponents of the conservative jurisprudence could
point to the history of subordination of racial and other minorities and the longstanding pluralist theoretical framework that suggests these groups are vulnerable
to politically marginalization.9 Proponents of the conservative jurisprudence,
however, could point to minority gains over the past half-century as represented
in the democratic victories of civil rights statute and a recently emerging public
choice theoretical framework that suggests organized minorities have a political
advantage over the diffuse majority in the political process.10 Regardless of who
has the better of this debate in the abstract, I argue in this Essay that the Court
should be encouraged to follow Justice Scalia’s lead and be open about how they
think politics operates in the context of the cases being adjudicated.
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Such openness should be encouraged because conceptions of the operation
of politics inevitably influence important parts of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence. For example, a central underlying question in the Supreme Court’s
equal protection jurisprudence is when should the Court step in to provide special
protection from the majoritarian process.11 This special judicial protection, which
comes in the form of close scrutiny of democratically adopted laws, is usually
extended to members of groups who the Court perceives as vulnerable in the
democratic process.12 The determination of who is vulnerable ultimately turns on
how the Court conceives politics. Despite the inevitable influence of conception
of politics on the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, members of the
Court are not always explicit about the influence of these conceptions on their
decisions. For every case in which justices have provided clues about how a
particular conception of politics influenced their decision to extend or to not
extend close scrutiny, there are many other cases in which justices have been
much more opaque. The Court has justified its decision to subject to strict
scrutiny laws that benefit racial minorities on the basis of a principle that that the
Constitution is colorblind.13 But lying beneath this rhetoric was an undefined
concern that “simple racial politics” influenced the democratic adoption of such
laws.14 In addition, the Court’s decisions not to extend special judicial protection
11

See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 113-14 (1979) (“To be sure, the elderly are not a
‘discrete and insular minority’ in need of ‘extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.’”); San Antonio Independent School District No. 1 v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
(“The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none the traditional indicia of
suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”).
12
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (determining that classifications
based on alien status “are inherent suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny [because] [a]liens
are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular minority’”). For most members of groups seeking
special judicial protection, the Court has determined that they are not politically powerless
apparently because the legislative body has passed laws protective of their interests. See, e.g.,
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442-47 (1985) (holding the mentally disabled
were not a suspect class in part because they apparently had political power as represented by the
law passed responsive to their needs); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-55 (1971) (denying
the claim of poor residents for judicial protection against vote dilution on a similar basis).
13
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 747 (2007) (suggesting that the more faithful interpretation of the holding in Brown v. board
of Education outlawing school segregation was that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment prevents states
from according differential treatment to American children on the basis of the color of their skin”);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378 (2003) (quoting Justice John Marshall Harlan’s opinion in
Plessy v. Ferguson that “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens”); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218 (1995) (“[T]he guarantee
of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else
when applied to a person of another color.”).
14
See, e.g., Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (describing the function of strict

3

to members of groups like the poor, the aged, and disabled seems to be based on a
vague notion that they are only occasional and not perpetual losers in the
majoritarian process. Finally, the Court has been much more reluctant to defer to
congressional laws protecting the aged, and the disabled against discrimination
that provide members of these groups with the right to sue states for violations of
federal laws.15 The Court in its reasoning emphasizes its concern about protecting
the sovereignty of the state.16 But what also seems to animate this jurisprudence
is a suspicion about the power of these groups to secure laws that provide them
with an opportunity to obtain monetary rents from the state at the expense of the
vulnerable public.17
In other areas of the law, this lack of transparency has created confusion
about the sources of judicial decision-making, leading many down the path of
easy critique about judicial willfulness and personal value imposition. For
example, the case of Citizens United v. FEC seems fundamentally inconsistent
with the conservative judicial concern about minority capture of politics in other
constitutional contexts. In Citizens United, a conservative majority forced the
deregulation of independent expenditures on campaigns through the invalidation
of a federal prohibition on independent corporate and union expenditures for
electioneering communications. The Court held the prohibitions on independent
expenditures violated the First Amendment freedom of speech. For many
commentators, this was simply another example of conservative justices favoring
the corporations at the expense of the people.18 Commentators predicted (rightly
perhaps) that as a result of the decision, elections would be awash with corporate
money and this would further the corporate capture of politics.19 This
conservative decision to overturn the federal campaign finance law therefore
appears to counter the precepts of public choice theory. It seems to allow for the
very minority group control of politics at the expense of the broader, diffuse, and
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politically weak public – the very political condition that the conservative justices
seemed to see themselves as fighting against in equal protection context. But
looking more closely at the opinion, it is apparent in the reasoning that the
conservative justices were in fact seeking to follow the theory’s very logic.
Justice Kennedy, in an opinion that Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Alito
joined, noted that a federal exemption for speech by Political Action Committees
(PACs) – organizations that pool campaign money from members and donate the
funds to campaigns – accompanied the ban on corporate speech.20 The
conservative plurality explained that it is burdensome to form these PACs and
expensive to administer them.21 As a result, “fewer than 2,000 of the millions of
corporations in the country have PACs.”22 Only these few corporations can
engage in electioneering communications in the face of the corporate speech ban.
The corporate speech ban, therefore, only silenced “certain voices” at particular
“points in the speech process.” For the conservatives, the law represented a
restriction that distinguished between different speakers. It prohibited the speech
of the many small corporations without large amounts of wealth and sanctioned
the speech of their more wealthy corporate counterparts. 23 This distinction
between speakers combined with the advantages that wealthy corporations
already have with respect to lobbying elected officials made the ban especially
pernicious. Rather than ban corporate speech, Justice Kennedy explained, the
way to check corporate factions was “by permitting them all to speak … and by
entrusting the people to judge what is true and what is false.”24
Many criticisms can be directed to conservative justices’ justifications for
invalidating the corporate speech ban and the liberal dissenters provided some of
them.25 But whether it was right or wrong is beside the point. What is relevant
here is that the conservative justices’ expressed concerns with the law that are
very much consistent with those that animated in the cases described above. They
appeared to be concerned about a law that they see as advantaging a particular
subset of corporations at the expense of the broader public. And while they never
expressed it explicitly in the opinion, what seemed implicit is a determination that
the corporate speech ban and the political action committee exemption enabled
corporate capture of the political process that they sought to ameliorate through a
deregulation of campaign speech.
Given the oft-vague prescriptions of the law, and particularly the
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Constitution, combined with the fact that judges are human, it is simply not
feasible for members of the Court to not be influenced by conceptions of how the
world works or should work in their decisions. If conceptions of politics
inevitably influence the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, these
conceptions should be subject to the adversarial process and broader democratic
engagement to both avoid judicial error and maintain judicial legitimacy. This is
the real lesson of the infamous Lochner era that scholars have mostly overlooked.
In this era, an implicit laissez faire conception of the economy seemed to have
influenced the widespread judicial invalidation of state and federal regulations
pursuant to a right to contract found in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause.26 The reaction to the Lochner era by scholars and judges alike has been
that the Court should not be influenced in its decisions by theoretical conceptions
about how the world works. The Court should just instead apply the law. This
reaction has led to a post-Lochner era jurisprudence in which the justices try to
hide the ball on how conceptions of how the world operates influence their
decisions. This judicial opaqueness leads to a corresponding public outcry about
inadequately supported judicial determinations and unpersuasive judicial
reconciliations of doctrinal inconsistencies.
The problem with the Court’s Lochner era jurisprudence was not that
conceptions of how the world works influenced judicial decision-making.
Instead, the mistake was that members of the Court never clearly publicized how
these conceptions influenced their decisions. As a result, there was no
opportunity to contest the laissez faire conception of the economic marketplace
that seemed to animate the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this era. This
ultimately contributed to judicial error, as an out-dated economic philosophy
could not account for the evolution in economic thinking and social realities. The
lack of transparency also undermined judicial legitimacy as a Court unable to
provide adequate support for its decision in the law or to reconcile precedent was
left vulnerable to critics who described its motivation in purely partisan terms.
The lesson from the mistakes of the Lochner era is not that justices should
do the impossible and cabin their conceptions of how the world works off from its
decisions. Instead, Court should be open about what conceptions of the world are
influencing its decisions. For example, in the Court’s civil rights jurisprudence,
this means that justices should be open about how conceptions of the operation of
politics are influencing its determination of when the Court should step in to
provide special judicial protection for members of groups from the majoritarian
process and when it should not. The opportunity for adversarial engagement in
the courts and broader democratic engagement outside the courts about how
conceptions of the operation of politics will reduce judicial error. It will provide
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members of the Court with the opportunity to examine evidence and engage
arguments about how politics operates rather than rely on unquestioned
theoretically based impressions. In addition, and perhaps counter-intuitively,
judicial transparency about the influence of conceptions of politics on its
decisions will increase the legitimacy of the Court. While such transparency will
incur the cost of eliminating the public veneer of an apolitical Court merely
applying the law, these costs would be overcome by the legitimacy gains from
doctrinal coherence.
In the civil rights context, scholars and litigants can encourage judicial
transparency about the influence of conceptions of how politics operates on its
jurisprudence. Scholars can do so by focusing less on criticizing the Court for
being influenced by such conceptions. Instead, scholars should recognize the
inevitability of these conceptual influences and continue to develop theories
explaining how doctrine has developed in accord with these influences. Then
rather than de-legitimizing the Court for doing what is inevitable, scholars should
be willing to make the case for or against the particular conception that the Court
has adopted. This would require that scholars engage in the inter-disciplinary
enterprise and draw on the social sciences and empirical work to inform their case
for how the world actually works. Civil rights litigants can encourage judicial
transparency by anticipating in advance the influence of conceptions of politics on
judicial decision-making. Through trial and appellate briefs that engage the
discussion about how politics operated in the context of the relevant democratic
decision, the Court can be forced to be transparent about their agreement or
disagreement with the conception being proffered.
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